Grievance Initiation and Resolution. A Test of the Behavioural Theory by Gandz, Jeffrey
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Grievance Initiation and Resolution. A Test of the Behavioural Theory"
 
Jeffrey Gandz
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 34, n° 4, 1979, p. 778-792.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/029014ar
DOI: 10.7202/029014ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 05:07
Grievance Initiation and Résolution 
A Test of the Behavioural Theory 
Jeffrey Gandz 
The Authorputs Walton and McKersie's behavioural theory 
of labour negotiations to test in a study of a non-random sample 
of 118 bargaining units. 
In A Behavioral Theory ofLabor Negotiations2, Walton and McKersie 
propose a typology of Union-management relationship patterns in which 
four attitudinal dimensions covary. Thèse are: the motivational orientations 
and action tendencies the parties hâve toward each other; the beliefs they 
hold about the other's legitimacy; the level of trust that exists in the conduct 
of affairs; and the degree of friendliness that exists between the parties. Fur-
thermore, the relationship pattern is hypothesized as having, among other 
conséquences, an impact on the administration of the collective agreement 
although the authors are not spécifie about the nature of this impact. 
Peterson and Tracy3 note that despite its influence on the industrial 
relations field, Walton and McKersie's work has not stimulated a substan-
tial number of empirical studies. Many of their propositions, derived from 
expérience, observation, and limited empirical studies, remain untested. 
MODEL 
In part of a larger study of factors associated with grievance rates and 
the use of arbitration,4 the attitudes held by union and management person-
* GANDZ, Jeffrey, Professor, School of Business Administration, The University of 
Western Ontario, London, Ontario. 
1 This study was supported by a grant from Labour Canada and a Canada Council 
Doctoral Fellowship. The author is indebted to Jim Rush for his comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
2 WALTON, R.E. and J.B. McKERSIE, A Behavioural Theory ofLabor Negotiations, 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
3 PETERSON, R.D., and Lane TRACY, "Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of 
Labour Negotiations", Industrial Relations, 16, No. 1, (February) 1977, pp. 35-50. 
4 GANDZ, J., "Employée Grievances; Incidence and Patterns of Résolution". Un-
published Ph.D. thesis. York University, Toronto, Canada, 1978. 
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nel toward each other were seen as variables which might be related to the 
initiation of formai grievances and the ways in which they are resolved. 
Where there is distrust, dislike, and suspicion of management, 
managerial actions are more likely to be perceived as oppressive or iné-
quitable and a grievance may be lodged to redress the perceived inequity. 
Such prevailing attitudes may block or distort communications between 
employées and management so that the reasons underlying managerial ac-
tions may be unknown and a grievance may be lodged to obtain informa-
tion. Conflicts which may in fact represent common problems will tend to 
be viewed as zero-sum situations and a grievance may be lodged rather than 
a discussion initiated. Where distrust, and dislike prevail, informai, 
problem-solving discussions will be neither initiated nor fruitful. Where 
compétition exists between union and management the prosecution of 
grievances becomes an important union tactic for winning the loyalty of 
employées. 
When union-management relations are conflictful, rather than 
coopérative, grievances may be used as pressure tactics. Overloading the 
grievance procédure, imposing a heavy load for management and thereby 
providing an opportunity for haranguing and confronting management in 
grievance meetings, may be tactics used in exerting pressure on 
managements between successive rounds of negotiations or before new for-
mal negotiations are scheduled to commence5. 
It is hypothesized, therefore, that the attitudinal components of union-
management relationships will be related to both grievance incidence and 
grievance resolution. Using Walton and McKersie's terms of Conflict and 
Coopération to dénote attitudinal states, 
Hl. Grievance rates will be lower in bargaining units with a 
coopérative union-management relationship than in those in 
which the relationship is one of conflict. 
H2. Bargaining units with coopérative union-management relation-
ships will be less likely to resort to use of arbitration than those 
with conflict relationships. 
It is recognized that establishing causality in thèse propositions will be 
extremely difficult since conflict relationships may be a conséquence of 
grievance activity as well as a cause. 
5 STAGNER, R. and Hjalmar ROSEN. Psychology of Union-Management Relations, 
Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1965. 
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METHOD 
A non-random sample of 118 bargaining units, representing 516 cor-
porate entities and 28 trade unions, were recruited for this study. 98 were in-
dustrial, blue collar units, 17 were technical/professional/white collar 
units, and 3 were a mixture of both blue and white collar employées. The 
bargaining units varied in size from 3 to 14,500 employées and were in in-
dustries as diverse as petrochemicals, food retailing, automobile assembly, 
and mining. 
Data on grievance incidence and patterns of grievance resolution were 
gathered from grievance logs, reports, or files; grievance rates and conces-
sion ratios were then computed7. 
A multi-part, self administered questionnaire was completed by the ex-
ecutive responsible for industrial relations in each bargaining unit. The 
identity of the respondent was secured so as to ensure that, in multi-unit 
corporations, responses were obtained from a unit executive rather than 
multiple responses from a corporate executive. Four sets of items concerned 
union-management relations. 
(i) A battery of 11 items related to day-to-day union-managernent rela-
tions and were designed to tap the four attitudinal components of the 
relationship identified by Walton and McKersie8. 
(ii) A second set of 10 items tapped respondents' views about the helpful 
or harmful impact of the union on such organizational process and 
performance aspects as productivity, discipline, and communications. 
Both of thèse item batteries are shown in Figure 1. 
6 A total of 68 corporations were approached and asked to participate. 9 refused and 8 
did not provide the required data by the time data collection was shut off. 
7 Grievance rate = Number of grievances filed par 1000 employées in the bargaining 
unit per year. 
Arbitration rate = Number of arbitration cases per 1000 employées in the bargaining 
unit per year. 
Concession ratio = Number of grievances allowed or compromised
 v JQQQ 
Number of grievances filed 
8 Items for this set were suggested, in part, by the work of TRAC Y and PETERSON 
and TRAC Y on testing the Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations in contract regotiations. 
TRACY, Lane, "The Influence of Non-economic Factors on Negotiators", Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 27, No. 2, (January), 1974, pp. 204-215. 
PETERSON, R.D. and Lane TRACY, "Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of Labor 
Negotiations", Industrial Relations, 16, No. 1, (February), 1977, pp. 35-50. 
FIGURE 1 
Union-Management Relations 
Indicate the extent to which the following statements 
characterized the day-to-day relationships between union 
and management officiais during the last completed collec-
tive agreement: Always Often 
1.1 Both parties showed respect for the goals and 
objectives of the other 
1.2 Union and management personnel trusted each 
other 
*1.3 Both union and management tried to compète — _ 
for the loyalty of employées 
1.4 The union influenced management décisions — _ 
1.5 When conflicts arose, negotiations between 
union and management took place with a spirit 
of coopération. — — 
1.6 Both sides believed that the tactics used by the 
other were legitimate — — 
1.7 Union and management personnel were friend-
ly to each other — — 
1.8 Each side showed an understanding of the 
other's position — — 
*1.9 There was personal animosity between union 
and management officiais — — 
•1.10 Each side tended to suspect the intentions or 
honesty of the other _ — 
*1.11 Interactions between union and management 
officiais tended to be hostile — _ 
* Reversed scoring 
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FIGURE 1 (Cont'd.) 
Union Impact Battery 
In your opinion, what was the extent to which the union 
fîlled the following rôles during the last completed collée- strongly Slightly Slightly 
tive agreement.
 agree Qgree disagree 
*2.1 The union interfered with discipline — — — 
*2.2 The union was responsible for reduciding 
worker productivity — — — 
2.3 The union was valuable in communicating 
workers' views to management — — — 
*2.4 The demands of the union tended to endanger 
the compétitive position of the firm — — — 
2.5 The union helped management maintain 
discipline — — — 
2.6 The union represented the views of the 
employées — — — 
2.7 The union was valuable in assisting in com-
munications between management and 
employées — — — 
2.8 The union promoted harmony between 
workers and management — — — 
*2.9 A lot of union demands were influenced by 
union politics rather than by members' wishes' — — — 
*2.i0 The union rnade it difficult to reward 
employées on the basis of merit — — — 
* Reverse scoring 
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(iii) A third set of 23 items was abstracted from Derber et al's grievance 
questionnaire9. They sought respondents* assessment of a number of 
aspects of grievance discussions such as the tone of discussions, the ex-
hibition of anger, distrust, empathy, and the use of threats. Other 
items in this set related to the openness of the grievance procédure to 
complaints as well as narrowly defined grievances, constructionism in 
contract interprétation, reliance on précèdent, concession to 
grievances which were creating problems for the other party, and 
overall satisfaction with the grievance procédure. 
(iv) The fourth set of items asked respondents to indicate the extent to 
which consultation took place between union and management on a 
variety of work-related issues such as transfers, contracting-out, pro-
motions, discipline, and technological change10. 
The inter-item corrélation matrix for the 11 Union-Management Rela-
tions items (Table 1) showed that items 1.3 (compétition for employée loyal-
ty) and 1.5 (union influence on management décisions) correlated weakly 
with each other and with the remaining nine items in the battery. 
TABLE 1 
Inter-item corrélations1 in Union-Management 
Relations Battery 
(n = 118) 
/ . / 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 LU 
1.1 
1.2 .68 
1.3 .25 .37 
1.4 -.19 -.20 -.28 
1.5 .64 .67 .29 -.20 
1.6 .65 .62 .40 -.36 .62 
1.7 .55 .62 .19 -.08 .57 .54 
1.8 .57 .62 .33 -.30 .58 .58 .64 
1.9 .38 .33 .19 -.05 .41 .36 .51 .25 
1.10 .40 .52 .28 -.11 .36 .44 .42 .26 .32 
1.11 .36 .32 
ict mom 
.25 
lent 
-.06 .26 .26 .48 .37 .34 
î. Pearson prodi 
.27 
9 Items for this set are adapted from DERBER et al. 's investigations of Plant union-
management relations. To save space they are not shown in full in this paper. 
DERBER, M., W.E. CHALMERS, M.T. EDELMAN and H.C. TRIANDIS, Plant 
Union-Management Relations; From Practice to Theory, Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois, 
1965. 
10 Thèse issues were suggested in preliminary interviews with industrial relations 
managers and by a previous study of consultative practices (MIKALACHKI, et al.). 
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The remaining nine items inter-correlated highly (r= .50). Thèse 9 item 
scores were summed to give a score on a scale of Union-Management Rela-
tions with a mean inter-item corrélation of .50 and internai consistency 
(Standardized item alpha) of .90. A high score on this scale indicates a con-
flict relationship, a low score indicates coopération. 
Factor analysis of the inter-item corrélation matrix for the 10 items 
relating to the union's impact on the organization was necessary in order to 
clarify the relationships between the items; the factor structures are shown 
in Table 2, below. 
TABLE 2 
Union Impact on Bargaining Unit 
Factor Structure Following Quartimax Rotation 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Union Harm Union Value Communalities 
2.1 .60 .26 .43 
2.2 .84 .23 .75 
2.3 .18 .76 .61 
2.4 .62 .08 .39 
2.5 .32 .45 .31 
2.6 .27 .60 .43 
2.7 .13 .86 .76 
2.8 .48 .60 .60 
2.9 .44 .01 .20 
2.10 .57 .17 .35 
Eigenvalue 3.78 1.06 .35 
Items stating the adverse impact of the union on the organization load-
ed on the first factor; those describing the bénéficiai effects of the union 
loaded on the second. Two items, both rather extrême statements about the 
value of the union, loaded moderately on both factors, but more heavily on 
the second, Union Value factor. 
Two scales, Union Harm (r= .40; ot= .77) and Union Value (f= .50; 
a= .83), were developed by summing item scores of the items loading on 
each of thèse factors. A high score on the Union Value scale indicates the 
respondent feels the union is valuable to the organization. A high score on 
the Union Harm scale indicates that the union is not harmful. 
In the set of 23 items relating to the grievance procédure respondents 
were asked about their own behaviors and the behaviors of the union of-
ficiais. For example, they were asked if they (always, usually, sometimes, 
never) displayed anger and if the union officiais (always, usually, 
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sometimes, never) displayed anger. Scores on the dimensions of anger 
(GTONE), suspicion (GSUSP), empathy (GEMPATH), use of threats 
(GTHREAT) and reliance on précèdent (GPREC), were the sum of the 
respondents' scores on own behaviors and union behaviors, which were 
highly correlated. The measure of the openness of the grievance procédure 
to complaints (GPROC) was a single item measure. 
The item scores on the Consultation battery were summed across the 12 
issues to give a score on an overall Consultation scale. (f = .28, a = .82) 
RESULTS 
Grievance Rates and the Use of Arbitration 
Grievances were categorized as either "Disciplinary", arising from a 
disciplinary action taken by management such as a reprimand, suspension 
or discharge, or "Non-Disciplinary". 
The mean disciplinary grievance rate was 17.0 per 1000 employées per 
year with a standard déviation of 30.7. 24 of the 118 bargaining units had 
no disciplinary grievances, including 12 of the 17 white collar groups. The 
mean non-disciplinary grievance rate was 108.3 with a standard déviation of 
168.5. Only six of the 118 bargaining units had no non-disciplinary 
grievances, four of them being white collar units. 
42% of the bargaining units used arbitration at ail in their last, com-
pleted collective agreements; 25% had at least one disciplinary grievance ar-
bitrated and 33% had at least one non-disciplinary grievance heard at ar-
bitration. Only 1.3% of ail grievances in the whole sample actually reached 
arbitration and only 2 of the 17 white collar units had an arbitration during 
their last collective agreements. 
Inter-scale Corrélations 
The Union-Management Relations scale correlated highly with the 
Union Harm and Union Value scales as well as with the items in the 
grievance procédure battery which related to anger, the use of threats, 
suspicion, and empathy. Thèse corrélations are to be expected since 
respondents viewing the union-management relationship as coopérative are 
also likely to view the union as having a bénéficiai, or at least not harmful, 
impact on the organization. Furthermore, coopérative relationships should 
resuit in grievance discussions which are free of anger, threats, suspicion 
and in which participants exhibit interpersonal empathy. 
TABLE 3 
1 UNION HARM 
2 UNION VALUE 
3 UNION-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS 
4 CONSULTATION 
5 GTONE 
6 GSUSP 
7 GEMPATH 
8 GPROC 
9 GPREC 
10 GTHREAT 
Inter-scale Corrélations1 
(n = 118) 
1 2 3 4 5 
.49** 
-.60** -.65** 
.08 .25** -.19* 
.37** .25** -.43** .14 
.37** .45** -.58** .13 54 
-.31** -.26** .35** -.01 08 
.03 .11 -.07 .43** 19 
.30** .20* -.29** .14 29 
.40** .43** -.57** .05 40 
*p<,05 **p<.01 one tailed test. 
i. Pearson product moment. 
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The fairly low order corrélation between the Union-Management Rela-
tionship and the Consultation scales (r = -.19, p<.05) confirms the findings 
of Mikalachki et al.10 that coopérative union-management relationships are 
not necessarily associated with extensive consultation. However, the data 
indicated a moderate association between the amount of Consultation and 
the extent to which the union was seen as valuable to the organization 
(r=.25,p<.01). 
Grievance Rates and Union-Management Relations 
Table 4, below, shows that there were significant rank order corréla-
tions between both disciplinary and non-disciplinary grievance rates and the 
four scales developed from the items in the questionnaire. We see that lower 
grievance rates are associated with organizational units in which the in-
dustrial relations managers view the union as more valuable and less harm-
ful to the organization than higher grievance rate units. The lower grievance 
rate units tended to hâve more coopérative relationships and there was 
greater union-management consultation on a variety of issues in the lower 
grievance rate units. 
TABLE 4 
Corrélations1 between grievance rates and 
Union-management relations scales 
(n = 118) 
Discipline Non-disciplii 
UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS .31** .28** 
UNION HARM -.30** -.35** 
UNION VALUE -.33** -.33** 
CONSULTATION -.18* -.18* 
*p<05 **p< .01 one tailed test. 
î. Spearman rank order corrélation. 
There was no évidence that the more coopérative relationship were 
typified by greater concessions by management in grievance proceedings. 
The rank order corrélations between the Union-Management Relations 
scale and the disciplinary and non-disciplinary concession ratios were in-
signifiant (P= .04 and .03 respectively). 
MIKALACHKI, A., G. FORSYTH and J.J. WETTLAUFER, "Managements View 
of Union-Management Relations at the Local Level", Study No. 17, Task Force on Labour 
Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968. 
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Arbitration Use and Union-Management Relations 
Classification of the bargaining units into those which had used ar-
bitration during their last contract and those which had not, showed 
significantly différent union-management relations (Table 5). 
Users of arbitration over disciplinary grievances had more conflictful 
union-management relations and reported greater anger and suspicion in 
the grievance procédure as well as more threats of industrial action. Users 
of arbitration for non-disciplinary grievances also reported more conflictful 
union-management relations as well as more anger, suspicion, and threats, 
and less empathy in grievance discussions. 
DISCUSSION 
This study has a number of weaknesses imposed by constraints 
associated with organizational access and the gathering of data at the 
bargaining unit level. The sample is non-random, making generalizations 
dangerous. Data hâve been gathered only from management personnel, 
rather than from both union and management représentatives and at-
titudinal data collection was restricted to a single, albeit knowledgeable and 
involved, industrial relations manager in each bargaining unit. 
The support for the hypothesized relationships between Union-
Management Relationships, grievance rates, and the use of arbitration is a 
contribution toward developing some empirical support for parts of Walton 
and McKersie's theory. The low order of the corrélations is not unexpected; 
clearly many factors enter into grievance rates and their resolution other 
than interpersonal relationships between union and management 
officiais211. Nor can one say, on the basis of thèse data, that there is any 
support for a causal relationship between the union-management relation-
ship and grievance rates and arbitration use, since a case could be made for 
each leading to the other. Attitude-behaviour confounding is minimized by 
obtaining data by différent means (questionaires and archivai analysis) but 
cannot be completely eliminated in a cross-sectional study of this type. In-
deed, a process view of conflict, which suggests that the aftermath of the 
manifestation affects the genesis of a subséquent épisode, means that a 
search for causation in this inter-relationship will almost certainly be a 
frustrating one. 
il PEACH and LIVERNASH propose a complex contingency framework with several 
groups of factors involved in the initiation and resolution of grievances. 
PEACH, D.A. and E.R. LIVERNASH, Grievance Initiation and Resolution: A 
Study in Basic Steel, Boston, Mass.: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, 1974. 
TABLE 5 
Comparison of scores on union-management 
relations scales and grievance procédure scales 
of users and non-users of arbituation 
Arbitrât ion Use 
Use Discipline F Use 
(n = 29) Non-Use (n = 39) 
(n = 89) 
UNION-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS 
UNION VALUE 
UNION HARM 
CONSULTATION 
GTONE 
GSUSP 
GEMPATH 
GPROC 
GPREC 
GTHREAT 
19.9 17.3 
12.0 13.5 
10.6 11.3 
20.4 23.2 
9.3 10.0 
4.9 5.8 
4.0 4.0 
3.2 3.6 
3.0 3.4 
6.4 7.1 
8.2** 19.4 
4.0* 12.2 
.8 10.2 
5.2* 20.7 
5.0* 9.2 
7.5** 5.1 
0 4.3 
2.7 3.2 
2.1 3.1 
6.0* 6.6 
*p<.05 **p<.01 
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Grievances cost management money. There are the tangible expenses 
associated with grievances such as any costs involved in the seulement itself, 
costs of managerial salaries while attending grievance meetings, the 
overhead costs of an industrial relations department, costs of the wages 
paid to grievors and union officiais for time spent in pursuing grievances, 
costs of lawyers and Counsel in arbitration cases. One organization in this 
study has estimated that grievances cost an average of $160 for each case 
that is processed to the last internai grievance procédure stage and $1950 for 
each case that goes to arbitration. In addition, there are the intangible costs 
that are believed to exist in high grievance rate organizations. There is the 
reduced amount of work that the aggrieved employée contributes., the con-
tagious effect that such an employée can hâve on a whole work unit, and the 
impact of that effect on morale that may be related to productivity, 
absenteeism, turnover, and even sickness and accidents. 
There would be little argument from management that a désirable 
organizational objective is the élimination of non-meritorious written 
grievances, those that emanate from intra-union political forces, tactical 
manoeuvres prior to formai collective negotiations, misunderstandings of 
managements' actions or intentions, or antipathy between union and 
management personnel. There would also be substantial agreement that it is 
functional for the organization to hâve employées' complaints and 
grievances resolved at the earliest possible stage, with the minimum time 
delay, provided that the resolution was satisfactory for the employée and 
the organization. Furthermore, there would be consensus among manage-
ment that they do not want first line supervisors turning a blind eye to pro-
visions in the collective agreement because they wanted to avoid a grievance 
or because they felt that their actions would not be supported by manage-
ment. 
It is clear, from this and other studies, that grievance rates and the 
resolution of grievances both affect, and are affected by, the climate of in-
dustrial relations in the organization. The relationships between employées 
and their supervisors, between union and management officiais at the shop 
floor level, and between professional industrial relations managers and their 
counterparts in the union hierarchy will be influenced by grievance activity 
within the organization and will exert an influence on both the génération 
and resolution or régulation of subséquent issues. 
Good industrial relations climates are not created overnight, although 
a good one can deteriorate into a poor one as a resuit of a single incident, 
Nor is it a simple matter to "change attitudes" of personnel, either union or 
management, when those attitudes hâve developed over a number of years 
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and hâve been reinforced on a continuai basis. It is naive to think that so-
meone who has fought union encroachment on managerial rights for 10 
years or more, is suddenly going to turn into a coopérative, problem-
solving, union respecting manager. It is equally as naive to expect a dyed-in-
the-wool union officer, with years of confrontation behind him, to sudden-
ly turn into a collaborative, integrative bargainer. 
But there are steps that management can take to improve the industrial 
relations climate in the long term. Serious considération should be given to 
improving the degree of consultation over such issues as over-time schedul-
ing, transferring of employées, and technological change. Before "joint 
décision making" is rejected out of hand, on a doctrinaire basis, some con-
sidération should be given to the possible impact of such activities on 
grievance rates and the overall union-management, employee-supervisor, 
relationships. 
Where there are Personal feuds, antipathy based on dogma, or a basic 
déniai of the rights of the other person to fulfill his function, low grievance 
rates cannot be expected. Hère management has to look to drastic remédies, 
including the replacement of personnel who cannot work together with the 
union. Where the relationships resuit from ignorance of the activities, 
responsibilities, and philosophies of the other, éducation and training can 
sometimes help improve the relationship. There hâve been efforts to help 
union and management officiais work together in improving their relation-
ships that hâve met with success (e.g., Blake et al., 1965)12 although such 
programs are believed to be rare. There are sufficient cases however, such as 
the International Harvester case reported by McKersie and Shropshire13 
(1962) or, in Canada, the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting case (U.W.O., 
School of Business Administration), to show that commitment to the im-
provement of union-management relationships by senior management can 
bring results. It is predicted that among the results of such improvements 
will be the réduction in numbers of grievances and the ability to résolve dif-
férences without recourse to arbitration. 
12 BLAKE, R.R., J.S. MOUTON, and R.L. SLOMA, "The Union-Management In-
tergroup Laboratory; Strategy for Resolving Intergroup Conflict", The Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science, 1, 25-27. 
13 McKERSIE, R.B. and W.W. SHROPSHIRE, Jr., "Avoiding Written Grievances; a 
Successful Program", Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, 35, 135-152. 
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Apparition et règlement des griefs: 
une vérification de la théorie béhavioriste 
Cette analyse vise à vérifier la double hypothèse que le nombre de griefs est 
moindre dans le cas des unités de négociation où existent de bonnes relations entre les 
parties que dans celles où elles sont tendues et que, dans les mêmes conditions, on a 
moins fréquemment recours à l'arbitrage. Les données recueillies portant sur un 
échantillon non aléatoire de 118 unités de négociation représentant 51 entreprises et 
24 syndicats; la cueillette s'est effectuée à partir d'un questionnaire fort élaboré 
remis aux responsables des relations professionnelles dans chaque unité de négocia-
tion. 
Aux fins d'analyse, les griefs furent divisés en deux catégories selon qu'ils se 
rapportaient ou non à des mesures disciplinaires. La moyenne des griefs à la suite de 
mesures disciplinaires s'établissait à 17.0 par 1,000 salariés tandis que, pour les griefs 
d'une autre nature, la moyenne était de 108.3 par 1,000 salariés également. 
Dans 42% des unités de négociation, aucun grief n'a été porté à l'arbitrage; 
dans 25% d'entre elles, il y eut au moins un grief qui fit l'objet d'un arbitrage et dans 
33% des unités de négociation, on a relevé au moins un grief de nature non 
disciplinaire qui s'est rendu à l'arbitrage. Toutefois, seulement 1.3% de l'ensemble 
des griefs a été l'objet d'arbitrage et, fait à noter, dans les 17 groupes de cols blancs, 
il n'y eut que 2 griefs qui ont atteint le stade de l'arbitrage. 
D'une façon générale, le nombre de griefs est moindre là où la direction du per-
sonnel considère le syndicat d'une façon positive. Plus le taux des griefs est bas, plus 
les relations sont bonnes entre les parties. 
Comme il est établi que chaque grief coûte en moyenne $160.00, que le coût 
moyen de ceux qui sont portés à l'arbitrage est estimé à $1,950.00, qu'il faut faire en-
trer en ligne de compte certaines autres pertes et que le taux des griefs affecte le 
climat des relations de travail, il y a lieu de prendre les moyens d'en éliminer le plus 
possible, même s'il faut parfois aller jusqu'à remplacer les préposés au personnel qui 
sont à couteaux tirés avec les syndicats. 
